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Abstract
We apply the information gap approach to resource allocation under Knightian (non-
probabilistic) uncertainty in order to study how best to allocate public resources between
competing defense measures. We demonstrate that when determining the level and composi-
tion of defense spending in an environment of extreme uncertainty vis-a-vis the likelihood of
armed conflict and its outcomes, robust-satisficing expected utility will usually be preferable
to expected utility maximisation. Moreover, our analysis suggests that in environments with
unreliable information about threats to national security and their consequences, a desire
for robustness to model misspecification in the decision making process will imply greater
expenditure on certain types of defense measures at the expense of others. Our results also
provide a positivist explanation of how governments seem to allocate security expenditures
in practice.
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“There are things we know that we know. There are known unknowns. That is to say there
are things that we now know we don’t know. But there are also unknown unknowns. There
are things we do not know we don’t know. So when we do the best we can and we pull all this
information together, and we then say well that’s basically what we see as the situation, that is
really only the known knowns and the known unknowns. And each year, we discover a few more
of those unknown unknowns.1
Donald Rumsfeld
Former U.S. Secretary of Defense
1 Introduction
What is the best procedure for a policy maker to employ when allocating scarce resources to
both deter military aggression, and in the event deterrence is unsuccessful, mitigate its effects,
if previous experience provides little relevant guidance? This paper demonstrates how both the
scope and nature of defense expenditure should change, if policy makers wish their decisions to
be robust to the type of Knightian (non-probablistic) uncertainty they ordinarily confront.
When allocating resources, policy makers, like households, face trade-offs. Many of the trade-
offs households encounter can reasonably be modeled in a deterministic setting—their incomes
may be uncertain, but when deciding between a new refrigerator or a new television set, we
generally assume that consumers know the marginal utility they will derive from each. By
contrast, policy makers often confront decisions in which the connection between allocations,
and the desirability of outcomes, are uncertain. Nonetheless they are often able to derive
reliable probabilistic models that link different allocations of funding with the moments of a
distribution of outcomes. For example, no one can predict precisely by how much a dollar
transferred between different components of the public health budget will affect an individual
citizen’s longevity. However, policy makers know a great deal about not only the prevalence,
but the distribution of infectious diseases, heart problems, and cancer for various population
groups and the efficacy of different treatments for large samples of patients.
Unlike public health decisions, allocating resources for national security involves decisions
where experiments are not possible (or at least unwise). Moreover, as relations between any set
of political actors on the international stage are constantly shifting, and both military doctrines
and technology continue to evolve, previous experience may not provide much useful information
upon which to base present-day decisions on how best to cope with future threats.2 The policy
maker whose country is threatened by hostile forces may know little about the probability
1Antulio J. Echevaria II (2008).
2David Hume, writing in 1748: “What is the foundation of all conclusions from experience?....All experimental
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distribution of possible damage or losses his or her country could suffer in the event of armed
conflict, as any estimate will require both an intimate knowledge of the adversary’s capabilities
and tactics, and the degree to which they might be counteracted by different defense allocations.
Indeed, the probability that an adversary will launch an attack may itself be unknown to the
policy maker, as it requires judgements about the intentions and expectations of foreign leaders,
or sub-state actors and yet is still dependent on the type of defense capabilities our policy maker
has chosen. Finally, often enough the enemy’s own political and military decision makers are
uncertain about their own goals or the best means to achieve them, at the time our decision
maker must determine the best allocation.
Many of the models designed to analyse military spending, starting with Richardson (1960),
consider the strategic behaviour of two agents engaged in an arms race within a deterministic
setting.3 Niho and Takeuchi (2001) consider the optimal amount of deterrence achieved by
overall defense spending as a deterministic resource allocation problem. Our work departs from
the existing literature in two important ways. First, in place of the familiar ‘guns versus butter’
dichotomy between defense expenditure and consumption (Brito (1972) and van der Ploeg and
de Zeeuw (1990), as well as Niho and Takeuchi (2001)), policy makers must also choose how
best to spend the former in a world where both the level of overall defense spending and its
internal allocation have uncertain and potentially differing effects on both deterrence and on the
outcome of conflict, should deterrence fail. Furthermore, if the uncertainty surrounding either is
non-probabilistic in nature—or as the evidence we present suggests, both are—merely shifting to
a framework of resource allocation with expected utility maximisation will prove inadequate.4
This is because the maximisation of expected utility demands that probability distributions
are known, or at least that statistical moments can be calculated. Required is a methodology
that enables the policy maker to allocate resources without requiring the use of unavailable
probabilistic information. By implementing the info-gap methodology, policy makers combine
what they know about security threats, and their relationships to installed military capabilities
with specified policy requirements, without requiring the policy maker to know how wrong the
available information is. Moreover, our analysis highlights one rationale for heightened spending
conclusions proceed upon the supposition that the future will be conformable to the past....why this experience
should be extended to future times, and to other objects, which for aught we know, may be only in appearance
similar; this is the main question on which I insist....If there be any suspicion that the course of nature may
change, and that the past may be no rule for the future, all experience becomes useless, and can give rise to no
inference or conclusion.”(Hume 2004, pp. 19, 21, 22)
3Intrilligator and Brito (1981) introduce probabilistic uncertainty to model the impact of nuclear proliferation.
The likelihood of an individual nuclear state initiating conflict declines as the number of nuclear states rises,
creating a non-monotonic relationship between the outbreak of nuclear conflict and the number of nuclear-armed
states.
4In Bier et al. (2007) a defender allocates resources to defend different targets to minimise expected losses.
The adversary’s preferred target is characterised by a known probability distribution.
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on some types of defense measures when there is little reliable information about the random
nature of threats to national security. This provides a possible positivist explanation for the
way governments allocate these expenditures today, and how they have done so in the past.
In section 2 we describe the general formulation of the info-gap methodology in the context
of defense expenditure. In section 3, by way of example, we consider a simple version of a
dilemma faced by many policy makers today: how much to spend overall on defense and how
much of that spending should be diverted towards the precision munitions, electronic warfare,
and space-based communications and intelligence necessary to implement the ‘Revolution in
Military Affairs’ (RMA) doctrine, and away from continued investment in large units employing
traditional industrial-age military technology and platforms.5 In section 4 we consider two
historical examples. First, we analyse whether the decision by successive French governments
during the interwar years to invest so heavily in the construction of the Maginot line represents a
failure to allocate defense expenditure in a robust manner. Then we consider how the experience
of US ground forces during the invasion of Iraq in 2003 demonstrated that many elements of the
RMA associated “network-centric warfare” doctrine, introduced in the late 1990’s to completely
transform the US Army by 2025 (Farrell et al., 2013), were profoundly non-robust to catastrophic
failure.
Throughout this paper, the risk of being attacked and the probability distribution of damage
conditioned on an attack occurring—both of which are info-gap uncertain—are related to both
the size and structure of the military force policy makers have chosen. We demonstrate that
when policy makers must operate in an environment in which information about the relationship
between threats and different allocations for defense is unreliable, expected utility maximisation
does not provide the best guidance for making decisions, because it is completely non-robust
to model misspecification. Using a hypothetical specification of security risks and the cost
effectiveness of alternative defense measures, we show that the desire of policy makers to attain
some degree of robustness to model misspecification, will have profound effects on both the
level of resources devoted to defense, and the distribution of these expenditures across the two
possible types of defense measures.
5First elaborated during the 1980’s by Soviet military theorists, in particular Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, then
chief of the Soviet General Staff, the RMA doctrine of war has already had a profound effect on Western military
planning. The move to adapt the U.S. military to RMA type warfare was spearheaded by the Department of
Defense’s Office of Net Assessment, and the man who has headed it since 1973, Andrew Marshall, and the vice
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff between 1994 to 1996, Admiral William Owens. See Eliot A. Cohen (1996).
4
2 Formulation
Consider a country facing various threats to its national security. These threats can take various
forms, including invasion by an aggressive neighbor or a terrorist attack. Policy makers perceive
threats to security from all sources as a bivariate distribution that includes both the event of
being attacked, and the damage the country will sustain conditional on the attack taking place.
In contrast to standard stochastic optimization problems, the distribution itself is uncertain.
Policy makers must decide what portion of the economy’s resources they will devote to countering
security risks, as well as how to allocate this expenditure between different defense measures,
where each measure has a different effect on both the risk of an attack and the potential damage
it will inflict. In this paper, this defense resource allocation dilemma is embedded within a
standard economic framework in which the representative risk-averse individual in this country
derives utility u(c) only from consumption, c. The threats considered here, and the effect of
any countermeasures, affect the resulting level of utility through their influence on the resources
that remain for consumption, the likelihood of being attacked, and the conditional distribution
of losses an attack may inflict.
Normalizing the economy’s resources to 1, the policy maker must choose the fraction of
all resources to devote to each of N different risk-mitigating expenditures χ = (χ1, . . . , χN ).
Without government debt, we require
∑N
i χi ≤ 1 where χi ≥ 0 for all i. Any government
expenditure detracts from the resources available for consumption, so that
c(χ) = 1−∑Ni χi.
On the other hand these government expenditures reduce the likelihood of an attack and the
fractional loss ψ in resources resulting from an attack if it takes place, where 0 ≤ ψ ≤ 1.
The probability density function (pdf) of realised threats, conditioned on risk mitigating
expenditures, is p(ψ|χ)—a probability distribution very poorly known to policy makers. The
best available estimate of p(ψ|χ) is denoted p˜(ψ|χ), but it is incontrovertible that p˜(ψ|χ) is
highly unreliable. We denote the probability of attack, as a function of defense spending χ,
by Pw(χ), and the best (but highly uncertain) estimate of this function is P˜w(χ). The salient
feature of this function is that P˜w(χ) is a decreasing function of each type of defense expenditure,
holding expenditures on other types fixed.
Let R(χ|p, Pw) be the expected utility resulting from defense expenditure χ, when the prob-
ability of the attack being realised is Pw, and the pdf of the damage ψ is p(ψ|χ):
R(χ|p, Pw) = Pw(χ)
∫ 1
0
u [(1− ψ)c(χ)] p(ψ|χ) dψ + (1− Pw(χ))u (c(χ)) (1)
where the last term u(c(χ)) represents the level of utility agents in this economy enjoy if no
security risks materialise.
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The info-gap model in the current context is an unbounded family of nested sets of prob-
ability models of p(ψ|χ) and Pw(χ), indexed by α, which represents the unknown horizon of
uncertainty in the policy maker’s best estimate of the chances of an attack occurring and of
the conditional distribution of the damages it would inflict. We denote this info-gap model by
F [α, p˜(ψ|χ), P˜w(χ)], where α ≥ 0.6 The important feature of this info-gap model is that larger α
entails larger possible deviations of the actual distributions of threats from their best estimates,
and accordingly a wider range of actual challenges the defense allocation chosen will need to
confront. A specific illustration of the info-gap model will be presented in section 3.2.
The policy maker requires that the expected utility be no less than a critical value, Rc. This
critical value may be uncertain, or the policy maker may wish to identify an acceptable value
of Rc that can be confidently anticipated, given a proposed allocation χ. In other words, the
goal of the policy maker is to maximise robustness to model uncertainty subject to a minimally
acceptable expected utility. That is, the policy maker wishes to choose an allocation χ that
yields the widest margin of error in model specification under which the expected utility equals
or exceeds Rc.
Specifically, the robustness of allocation χ is the maximum horizon of uncertainty, α, up to
which the expected utility is no less than Rc for all probability functions in F(α, p˜, P˜w):
α̂(Rc, χ) = max
{
α | R(χ|p, Pw) ≥ Rc, ∀ (p, Pw) ∈ F(α, p˜, P˜w)
}
(4)
More robustness is better than less, so the robust-optimal allocation at the minimally ac-
ceptable reward Rc is the allocation that maximises the robustness:
χ̂(Rc) = arg max
χ
α̂(Rc, χ) (5)
In summary, α̂(Rc, χ) is the robustness of allocation χ for achieving expected utility no less
than Rc. Likewise, α
∗(Rc) below is the maximal robustness for achieving expected utility no
less than Rc by choosing the appropriate values of χ. It is the maximum value of α̂(Rc, χ) from
6Info-gap models obey two axioms:
(i) Nesting asserts that the range of possible pdfs increases as α increases:
α < α′ =⇒ F [α, p˜, P˜w] ⊆ F [α′, p˜, P˜w] (2)
(ii) Contraction asserts that when α = 0, the best estimated models are the only possibilities:
F [0, p˜, P˜w] =
{
p˜, P˜w
}
(3)
These two axioms endow α with its meaning of a horizon of uncertainty. Henceforth we drop the explicit notation
conditioning F on the defense allocation χ considered. It is, however, at the heart of the problem being analyzed
in this paper that the stochastic nature of threats to the security of a country is influenced by the defense measures
it undertakes, albeit in a manner that is not fully known to the decision makers.
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(4), evaluated at Rc and χ̂(Rc) from (5).
α∗(Rc) = max
χ
{α̂(Rc, χ)} = α̂(Rc, χ̂(Rc)) (6)
As in any info-gap model (Ben-Haim, 2006), there is a fundamental trade-off between minimally
acceptable reward and robustness to uncertainty: the former decreases as the latter increases as
will be demonstrated subsequently.
It is useful to note the relationship between robustness and the smallest reward on
F(α, p˜, P˜w). Let
M(α, χ) = min
(p,Pw)∈F (α,p˜,P˜w)
{R(χ|p, Pw)} (7)
It can then be shown that M(α, χ) = Rc ⇔ α̂(Rc, χ) = α.
3 An Illustration with Two Types of Security
Expenditure
3.1 Basic Structure
By way of example, suppose all military expenditures fall into one of two broad categories. First,
there is the expenditure that incorporates recent innovations in military technology and tactics,
based on the intensive use of information technology, high-precision weaponry, and satellites
employed for both intelligence and command and control systems. We denote this type of
defense expenditure, associated with the ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ (RMA) doctrine, as
χ1. Second is the development and maintenance of large military formations, composed of large
numbers of troops receiving traditional military training to serve as infantrymen or to operate
armor, artillery, battleships and bombers. We denote this, the more traditional, industrial-
age type of military expenditure, and the one most closely associated with twentieth-century
warfare, as χ2. Both χ1 and χ2 are measured as shares of GDP, and we assume there is no
possibility of international borrowing. Recall that p(ψ|χ) is the probability density function
(pdf) of the damage the nation sustains in terms of lost GDP in the event that it is attacked,
and assume its shape is influenced by both the overall quantity of resources devoted to security,
χ1 +χ2, and also by how resources are divided between χ1 and χ2. Next we illustrate the kinds
of considerations which can be employed to set the shape of the probability models used in the
sequel.
With its reliance on small, highly mobile and specially trained military units, the RMA
doctrine can under the most optimal conditions limit the severity of casualties and other losses
for many kinds of attacks, but is more prone to catastrophic failure, particularly in the event
of a massive invasion by a large military force. Accordingly, we assume that holding the GDP
share of total defense expenditures fixed, the more defense expenditures are weighted towards
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RMA type, at the expense of traditional weapons systems and military formations, the lower are
the expected losses conditioned on an attack occurring, but the risk of extremely high damages
increases. By contrast, traditional large military formations can insure against the most severe
and widespread losses, but reliance on them will entail higher losses under most circumstances.
With all defense expenditure restricted to fall into these two broad categories, policy makers’
best (but highly uncertain) estimate of the damage pdf, conditional on being attacked and given
allocation of defense expenditure χ1 and χ2, is p˜(ψ|χ1, χ2). Given the long planning horizon
necessary to prepare defense forces, the relevant unit of time in this model is a decade.
The functional form for the best (but nonetheless highly uncertain) estimate of the damage
density function reflects all available knowledge about possible losses incurred in the event of
suffering an attack, and how the risks of these losses relate to the values of χ1 and χ2. In the
sequel we provide the specification of the particular probability density function we chose for our
illustration. Here, it suffices to note the two most salient features implied by our specification,
which capture the essence of the tradeoff assumed to exist between the two alternative types of
defense expenditure:
1. Mean damage generally declines in each of the security expenditure types. That is, at
least in the neighborhood of χ̂(Rc), we assume:
∂E(ψ)
∂χi
< 0, i ∈ {1, 2} (8)
2. At the same time, holding total security expenditure fixed, we expect to observe that
increases in the share devoted to traditional security expenditures lower the probability of
extreme damage, defined here as 60% of output. That is, we expect to generally observe:
∂Prob(ψ < 0.6)
∂χ2
∣∣∣∣
χ1+χ2
> 0 (9)
These damage estimates are conditional on the occurrence of an attack, but what do we
know about its probability?7 Clearly, determining the probability of attack will necessitate
estimating the military capabilities of potential adversaries—capabilities they may varyingly
wish to conceal or exaggerate.8 More difficult still is the need to assess the intentions of foreign
leaders, whose decision processes and perceptions are often informed by cultures and historical
memories different from one’s own.
7“As the ancient retiree from the Research Department of the British Foreign Office reputedly said, after
serving from 1903-50: ‘Year after year the worriers and fretters would come to me with awful predictions of the
outbreak of war. I denied it each time. I was only wrong twice.’” (Hughes, 1976, p. 48)
8“An adversary can still decide to attack even though his capabilities are relatively weak (1) if he miscalculates
the strength of the intended victim (as did the Germans in their attack on the Soviet Union in 1941, or the Arab
States in their underestimation of Israeli capabilities in 1967); (2) if he is more interested in applying political
pressure or making political gains even at the cost of military defeat; (3) if he gambles that his surprise attack
will have a force multiplier effect sufficient to compensate for his inferior capabilities.” (Handel, 1989, p. 241.)
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The assumption that all actors in the arena of world politics can be counted upon to
take a rational approach in foreign policy is not without some validity and utility; but
it does not offer a sufficient basis for estimating how these other actors view events,
calculate their options, and make their choices of action....To describe behavior as
“rational” is to say little more than that the actor attempts to choose a course of
action that he hopes or expects to further his values. But, of course, what the
opponent’s values are and how they will affect his policymaking and decisions in
different kinds of situations remains to be established. Moreover, foreign-policy
issues are typically complex in that they raise multiple values and interests that
cannot easily be reconciled. Even for the rational actor, therefore, choice is often
difficult because he faces a value trade-off problem. How the opponent will resolve
that dilemma is not easily foreseen, even by those close to him let alone by those
in another country who are attempting to predict his action on the basis of the
rationality of the assumption. (George, 1980, p. 66.)
Yet even if it were possible to understand a potential opponent’s existing intentions in a manner
sufficient to assign probabilities to an attack as a function of one’s own defense allocations,
this would still be insufficient. Intentions change.9 Hence the probability of an attack over the
course of a decade is subject to great uncertainty—policy makers can scarcely quantify with
much confidence the probability of an attack long before an enemy might even be considering
one.10
9Though the Japanese were not privy to German plans to attack the Soviet Union, during the months before
Operation Barborossa was launched on 22 June, 1941, the Japanese actively considered beginning to prepare for
a ‘northern war’—abrogating the Neutrality Pact they had just signed with the Soviet Union on 13 April of that
year (having fought unsuccessfully a brief war with it between May and September 1939), to launch an attack
on that country’s far eastern territories. Throughout that summer, civilians and military people in the Japanese
government weighed the various merits of attacking the Soviet Union, attacking the Western powers to the south,
or continuing to rely on diplomacy while consolidating gains in China and newly acquired French Indo-China.
Only at a military conference on 3 September did the more aggressive view of the Japanese Army prevail over
that of the more cautious Navy to initiate a war in the south, in response to continuing United States refusal
to restore normal economic relations and not impede further Japanese ambitions in China. Three days later an
imperial council approved the military’s recommendation that “if, by the early part of October, there is still no
prospect of being able to attain our demands, we shall immediately decide to open hostilities against the United
States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands (see Butow (1961, p. 250).) The decision to begin preparations for
the ‘southern war’ commenced only three months and a day prior to the attack on 7 December, 1941.
10“The Americans—and many Japanese—had thought that any attack on the distant American base at Pearl
Harbor was impossible, given the inability of the Japanese fleet to conduct such distant operations due to refueling
challenges and the need for radio silence along the long route to Hawaii.” (Hansen, 2017, p.143)
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3.2 A Fractional Info-Gap Model of Uncertainty
The density function p˜(ψ|χ) is the best estimate of the pdf of damage from an attack, given
security allocation χ = (χ1, χ2). However, this estimate is based on fragmentary and unreliable
evidence, and hence contains potentially serious but unidentifiable errors. The same is true for
the estimated probability of attack, P˜w(χ). The true values deviate from these estimates by
unknown amounts. We use a fractional error info-gap model to represent the gaps in both the
pdf of the damage and the probability of attack (Ben-Haim, 2006). Let P denote the set of all
pdfs on [0, 1]. For any α ≥ 0 our info-gap model consists of all density functions and probability
values that differ proportionally from p˜(ψ|χ) and P˜w(χ), respectively, by no more than α. That
is:
F(α, p˜, P˜w) =
{
(p(ψ), Pw) : p(ψ) ∈ P, |p(ψ)− p˜(ψ|χ)| ≤ αp˜(ψ|χ), for all ψ
0 ≤ Pw ≤ 1, |Pw − P˜w(χ)| ≤ αP˜w(χ)
}
, (10)
The value of the fractional error α is unknown, so the info-gap model is not a single set,
but rather an unbounded family of nested sets of possible pdfs and probabilities. Since α is
unbounded from above, there is no known worst case.
3.3 Robustness Function
Conditioned on an attack occurring, the expected utility under the best estimates of damage
density is:
r˜(χ) =
∫ 1
0
u [(1− ψ)c(χ)] p˜(ψ|χ) dψ (11)
where c(χ) = 1− χ1 − χ2
The unconditional expected utility, based on the best estimates of the damage pdf p˜(ψ|χ) and
the probability of attack P˜w(χ), (as defined in (1)) is:
R˜(χ) = P˜w(χ)r˜(χ) + (1− P˜w(χ))u(c(χ)) (12)
We assume that r˜(χ) < u(c(χ)), so that the expected utility in the event of an attack is always
smaller than it is in the absence of an attack. The expected utility for arbitrary p(ψ|χ) and Pw
is obtained from (1). The objective of the policymaker, for a given Rc, is to choose the defense
expenditures χˆ(Rc) which attains an expected reward that does not fall below Rc for the widest
horizon of uncertainty.
In order to find such a robust-optimal allocation we first need to express the robustness to
model uncertainty (α̂) as a function of the defense allocation. Full details of this representation
are provided in the Appendix. Intuitively, we do that by exploiting the assumption that marginal
utility is positive and decreasing in ex-post resources, and choose probability objects, to be
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denoted by Pˆw and pˆ, which are ’worse’ than P˜w(χ) and p˜(ψ|χ), respectively, but differ from
these proportionally by no more than α. Since an attack can only decrease expected welfare,
the probability of attack is taken to be:
Pˆw =
 (1 + α)P˜w if α < (1− P˜w)/P˜w1 else (13)
For the damage pdf, we distinguish between α ≤ 1, and α > 1. For the former we use:
pˆ(ψ|χ) =
 (1− α)p˜(ψ|χ) if ψ ≤ ψm(1 + α)p˜(ψ|χ) else (14)
where ψm is the median of the best estimate of the damage pdf p˜(ψ|χ).
For α > 1 we use:
pˆ(ψ|χ) =
 0 if ψ ≤ ψα(1 + α)p˜(ψ|χ) else (15)
where ψα satisfies:
(1 + α)
∫ 1
ψα
p˜(ψ|χ) dψ = 1 (16)
In other words, ψα is the 1− 1/(1 + α) quantile of p˜(ψ|χ).
Next we define:
r˜1(χ) =
∫ ψm
0
u [(1− ψ)c(χ)] p˜(ψ|χ) dψ (17)
r˜2(χ) =
∫ 1
ψm
u [(1− ψ)c(χ)] p˜(ψ|χ) dψ (18)
r˜(χ) = r˜1(χ) + r˜2(χ) (19)
δr(χ) = r˜1(χ)− r˜2(χ) (20)
(21)
Since marginal utility is positive, r˜1 > r˜2. Consequently, as we show in Appendix A, the smallest
expected utility R(χ|p, Pw) over F(α, p˜, P˜w) is obtained with Pˆw in (13), and pˆ in (14) or (15)
depending on whether the given Rc implies an α value less than or equal to 1 or greater than
1, respectively. The lowest reward corresponding to these probability objects is given by (25)
and (27) in Appendix A, depending on whether α is smaller or greater than 1. Equating these
lowest levels of expected rewards to Rc, and solving these non-linear equations for α yields the
desired robustness as a function of the defense allocation chosen and the specified minimally
acceptable reward Rc.
The value of R˜ in (12) is expressed in terms of utility. In our economy the representative
individual has a maximum of a single unit of consumption, from which defense expenditures
and any damage to the economy are deducted. Define the allocation that maximises expected
utility under the best estimates of an attack probability and damages pdf:
χ∗ ≡ arg max
χ
R˜
(
χ|p˜( · |χ), P˜w(χ)
)
. (22)
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We use this allocation as a benchmark and define a loss function in terms of the compensating
consumption differential q. For that purpose let c(χ∗) = 1− χ∗1 − χ∗2 and define L(q) to be the
expected utility under p˜ and P˜w obtained under defense allocation χ
∗ when an amount q of
consumption is lost in addition to the amount
∑
i χ
∗
i diverted to defense spending:
L (q) = P˜w (χ
∗)
∫ 1
0
u [(1− ψ) (c(χ∗)− q)] p˜ (ψ|χ∗) dψ +
(
1− P˜w (χ∗)
)
u [c(χ∗)− q] (23)
Given any defence allocation χ, we find the unique value of q which satisfies L(q) = R˜(χ),
and denote this value by q˜(χ). Since L(q) is monotone in q, we can use q˜(χ) = L−1
(
R˜(χ)
)
to
represent the welfare loss associated with allocation χ under p˜ and P˜w compared to the expected
utility associated with χ∗. Since by definition R˜(χ) ≤ R˜(χ∗), q˜(χ) ≥ 0 for any χ. Likewise,
the loss of utility associated with any minimally acceptable reward, Rc ≤ R˜(χ∗) is represented
by its equivalent consumption loss qc = q(Rc) = L
−1(Rc). By definition, L(0) = R˜(χ∗). The
welfare loss associated with deviating from χ∗ can be compensated for by a greater robustness
to model uncertainty. This trade-off can be seen in Figure 1.
In Figure 1 the horizonal axis measures the sacrifice in expected utility expressed in con-
sumption equivalent compared to the allocation χ∗ for different defense allocations. The vertical
axis measures the robustness to model uncertainty. Along each curve marked as χi we keep the
defense allocation fixed, and display the trade-off between utility loss and robustness afforded by
that allocation. Thus, the curve associated with χ∗ begins at the origin, where the robustness is
zero and so is the utility loss. Higher robustness can only be assured at lower minimally assured
utility levels as shown by this upwards sloping curve. Other allocations provide different trade-
offs along their curves. The envelope of all these curves gives the highest possible robustness for
each utility loss on the horizontal axis, and depicts the allocation(s) that attain this combination
of reward and robustness. For instance, expected utility loss no greater than q0 is attained by
allocation χ0 under all probability models in F that differ fractionally from (p˜, P˜w) by no more
than αˆ(L(q0), χ0). Any other allocation that attains this maximal utility loss will do so at a
lower robustness. Not every defense allocation is necessarily present on the envelope, as shown
for example by allocation χ2 in Figure 1. This schematic figure also shows that if the choice
of defense allocations is restricted to a particular set, say {χ0, χ1} whose curves intersect at q1,
then χ0 provides higher robustness for all q ≤ q1 whereas χ1 does it for q > q1.
3.4 Numerical Results
This subsection presents the results of our analysis for particular specifications of the functional
forms involved that were chosen for illustrative purposes. These specifications illustrate the
intertwined channels through which defense allocations affect both the probability of suffering
an attack and the losses such an attack would impose. Our detailed specifications are presented
in Appendix B.
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Figure 1: Each of the blue curves corresponds to a different allocation χ and captures the
tradeoff between q˜ and α̂. The envelope in red is traced by the different blue curves and
represents the maximum acceptable loss expressed as the consumption equivalent qc and the
maximum attainable robustness αˆ to model misspecification.
We focus on a scenario with relatively high values of potential damage in the event of attack,
and choose parameters accordingly. For example, setting the overall size of the defense budget
to equal 10% of total available income, equally divided between χ1 and χ2, implies given the
functional specifications in (30) and (34), that expected losses in the event of attack will amount
to an equivalent loss of 35.7% of annual consumption, where the best estimate of the probability
of an attack taking place is 40.4%. Doubling the resources devoted to each, leaves the conditional
loss equal to 32.3% and reduces the probability of attack to 30.8%, and doubling the resources
yet again still leaves an expected loss of 26.4% conditional on being attacked with a best estimate
attack probability of just under 19.3%.
A policy maker who seeks to maximise expected welfare under (30) and (34) will devote just
under 6.38% of available resources to defense, with slightly more than half that, (χ1=0.0427),
allocated to RMA-type expenditure and the remainder, (χ2=0.0211), to traditional military
spending. Yet what is important to emphasise is that these probabilities of attack and damage
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density functions are merely best estimates, and the allocation that maximises expected utility
is not robust to any degree of model uncertainty.
Each frame in Figure 2 shows plots of allocations χ1 and χ2 that yield constant robustness.
Each frame in the figure is drawn for a different value of the lowest acceptable expected util-
ity, Rc, expressed in equivalent consumption-loss, qc = 0.05, 0.1, 0.15 and 0.2. We see that
the maximum robustness values corresponding to these minimal expected utility levels are α̂=
0.1442, 0.3016, 0.4746 and 0.6665, respectively. We note that greater robustness is attainable
when greater expected consumption-loss is allowed. The contours in each frame represent the
trade-offs between χ1 and χ2 for the fixed value of qc of that frame, and the degree of robustness
α̂ is marked next to the contour. In Appendix A we derive the maximum robustness with which
an allocation χ attains a minimally accepted reward Rc, (α̂ in (4)), for the fractional info-gap
model. We use these calculations to draw contour plots of constant allocations yeilding the same
maximum robustness. We now explain the implications of this figure in greater detail.
Consider the first panel in Figure 2 which corresponds to the consumption equivalent loss
of qc=.05. In Appendix A we explain how we calculate α̂(Rc, χ) – the maximum robustness of
a minimally accepted reward Rc for a defense allocation χ – for the functional specifications
described in Appendix B. Calculating the value of α̂ for different combinations of χ1 and χ2
in (26) and (28) yields the contours, each one corresponding to a different value of α̂ that
surround the unique maximum at α̂=0.1442. That maximum is attained at χ1=0.0515 and
χ2=0.0402. This means that a policy maker willing to accept utility equivalent of 5% less
consumption compared to that associated with expected utility maximisation can, by slightly
increasing expenditure on RMA-type weaponry from χ1=0.0427 to χ1=0.0515, but more than
doubling expenditure on traditional military hardware from χ2=0.0211 to χ2=0.0515, ensure at
least 95% of the (consumption equivalent) expected utility maximising reward even if the best
estimates of both the likelihood of attack, and the conditional damage are incorrect by as much
as 14.42%.
The remaining three panels in Figure 2 further demonstrate the trade-offs between how much
a policy maker is prepared to accept a lower level of utility (and hence higher values of qc), and
the maximum degrees of robustness to model uncertainty that this sacrifice affords. Thus by
setting qc=0.1, the degree of maximum robustness rises to 30.16%, achieved by setting χ1=0.0597
and χ2=0.0622; setting qc=0.15, the degree of maximum robustness rises to 47.46%, achieved
by setting χ1=0.0678 and χ2=0.0874; and setting qc=0.2, the degree of maximum robustness
rises to 66.65%, achieved by setting χ1=0.0761 and χ2=0.1156. In each case higher robustness
is achieved by allocating more resources to defense spending. This is hardly surprising. What
is being chosen here are allocations of defense expenditure designed to insure against model
misspecification that is too optimistic. Yet the increases are asymmetric—relatively little of
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Figure 2: Contour plots of combinations of χ1 and χ2 generating constant robustness. Different
contours correspond to different values of α̂, and each panel is drawn for a different value of
minimally acceptable value of expected utility – expressed in equivalent consumption loss terms
qc = 5%, 10%, 15% or 20% relative to maximised expected utility.
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the additional expenditure is allocated to the new RMA-type weaponry. Instead higher levels
of robustness are mostly achieved by sharply increasing the investment in the more traditional
weaponry.
Why should the share of resources devoted to traditional war fighting capacity rise so much
faster than RMA-type expenditures as the desired degree of robustness to model uncertainty
increases? The reason is that while increasing both types of security expenditure may generate
higher levels of deterrence and also lower the amount of damage suffered in the event of an
attack, it is the acquisition of planes, tanks and artillery, χ2, rather than high precision weaponry
and enhanced intelligence gathering, χ1, that works best in lowering the likelihood of extreme
damage.
Table 1 summarises the results in Figure 2. It emphasises the relationship that exists between
maximum robustness, α̂ and the acceptable level of losses qc, and how they are achieved by
different combinations of the two types of expenditure. The last column in Table 1 lists the
values of q˜ that express how much in consumption terms we actually expect to relinquish relative
to expected utility maximisation under the best estimates P˜w and p˜, (rather than qc which
represents the maximum reward we are prepared to relinquish). That is, while the maximum
loss of expected utility will be smaller than qc for all eventualities in a α̂ surrounding of P˜w
and p˜ in any of the rows in Table 1, the expected loss of utility relative to maximised expected
utility under the best available information is only q˜.
It is important to emphasise the distinction between two different decision strategies. An
expected utility maximiser allocates expenditure while paying little attention to low probability
events associated with extreme losses. In contrast, a robust satisficer, wary of relying too heavily
on uncertain estimated probabilities, will favour higher expenditure with the lion’s share of
additional resource devoted to spending that is less susceptible to catastrophic failure. This
illustrates how the search for robustness alters decision making when the trade-offs satisfy (8)
and (9). Nonetheless, the robust satisficer is not necessarily conservative, because the critical
consumption loss, qc, can be chosen at any value from cautious to cavalier.
Another way to understand the distinction between the expected utility maximiser and the
robust satisficer is to compare the two expansion paths in Figure 3 (detailed in Table 2). The
thick path to the right traces the allocations the former will choose (the tangencies between
the iso-expected utility contours—fixed values of q˜—and the dashed budget lines), while the
arrows to the left trace the choices made by the latter, each for any given overall level of defense
expenditure along its corresponding budget line. On any given budget line, the allocation chosen
by the robust satisficer generates a lower level of q˜, while the allocation chosen by the expected
utility maximiser generates a lower level of robustness. This phenomenon is illustrated by each
dashed iso-robustness contour, as it passes through the expected utility maximising allocation,
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qc χ1 χ2 αˆ q˜
0 0.0427 0.0211 0. 0.
0.05 0.0515 0.0402 0.1442 0.0033
0.1 0.0597 0.0622 0.3016 0.0126
0.15 0.0678 0.0874 0.4746 0.0277
0.2 0.0761 0.1156 0.6665 0.0488
0.25 0.0846 0.1468 0.8815 0.0757
0.3 0.0931 0.1806 1.1479 0.1082
0.35 0.1017 0.2111 1.4931 0.1411
Table 1: The combinations of χ1 and χ2 that generate maximum robustness α̂, for different
levels of maximally acceptable consumption equivalent losses compared to expected utility max-
imization, qc, and the implied loss in expected utility (in consumption equivalents) of these
defense allocations q˜.
which is associated with a lower robustness level than the one provided by the robustness
maximising allocation at the intersection of the same budget line with the robustness expansion
curve (at the points designated by the values of α̂).
To take one example, suppose the policy maker is faced with a fixed defense budget of 20%
of GDP. As can be seen in Table 2, an expected utility maximiser will choose the allocation
χ1=0.0921 and χ2=0.1079. By contrast, the robust satisficer, setting qc=0.2108, will raise the
spending on χ2 by 13.2% to χ2=0.1221 (and lower χ1 to 0.0779), and by doing so achieves
robustness of 71.08% while the expected utility loss in consumption equivalent terms increases
only from 0.0527 to 0.0541.
To better understand the implicit tradeoff between robustness and minimum acceptable levels
of utility, we plot in Figure 4 the implicit relationship between α̂ and qc for combinations of χ1
and χ2 between 0.01 and 0.2 (in increments of 0.01).
11 Each of the 400 grey curves represents
a particular allocation of defense expenditure (χ1, χ2) and traces the implicit relationships in
(26) and (28) between different values of α̂ and qc (with the aid of the loss function (23)).
Each curve corresponds to a particular defense allocation, and begins on the horizontal axis
where α̂=0 and the critical welfare loss, qc, equals the estimated value, q˜ evaluated under p˜ and
P˜w. As we consider larger deviations from the best guess uncertainty model, (i.e. increase α̂),
that particular allocation yields larger welfare losses, and hence the curves are upward sloping.
The upper contours of all the grey curves generate the envelope that traces the relationship
between maximum robustness α̂ and qc, starting at the origin which corresponds to the policy
that generates maximum expected utility and zero robustness.
Policy makers can first determine the minimum level of acceptable utility, denominated here
11This figure maps the specific functional forms and parameter values used here into the analogue of Figure 1
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Figure 3: Dashed straight lines represent budget lines for given levels of defense spending (first
column in Table 2). The solid thick curve represents all the combinations of χ1 and χ2 attaining
maximum expected utility for a given level of defense expenditure, (columns 2 and 3 in Table 2).
The thin line with arrows depicts, for the same total defense spending, all combinations of χ1
and χ2 attaining maximum robustness α̂ (last column in Table 2) for the minimally accepted loss
qc, (fifth column in Table 2). The solid contours represent the allocations that yield the same
expected utility (q˜) level as the allocation that maximises expected utility for the given total
defense spending. Dashed contours depict all the allocations that assure a maximal expected
utility loss of of qc with the same robustness level attained by the expected utility maximising
allocation corresponding to the same defense budget line.
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Total Welfare-Loss
Spending Minimization Robust Allocation
χ1 + χ2 χ1 χ2 q˜ qc χ1 χ2 q˜ αˆ
0.0638 0.0427 0.0211 0 0 0.0427 0.0211 0 0
0.075 0.0474 0.0276 0.0005 0.0203 0.0464 0.0286 0.0006 0.0570
0.1 0.0573 0.0427 0.0051 0.0641 0.0539 0.0461 0.0053 0.1871
0.125 0.0666 0.0584 0.0133 0.1048 0.0605 0.0645 0.0138 0.3175
0.15 0.0755 0.0745 0.0243 0.1425 0.0666 0.0834 0.0251 0.4475
0.175 0.084 0.091 0.0375 0.1777 0.0723 0.1027 0.0387 0.5784
0.2 0.0921 0.1079 0.0527 0.2108 0.0779 0.1221 0.0541 0.7108
0.225 0.0999 0.1251 0.0696 0.2422 0.0832 0.1418 0.0711 0.8464
0.25 0.1073 0.1427 0.0879 0.2723 0.0885 0.1615 0.0896 0.9863
0.275 0.1144 0.1606 0.1075 0.3015 0.0933 0.1817 0.1093 1.1574
0.3 0.1213 0.1787 0.1283 0.3300 0.0980 0.2020 0.1302 1.3468
Table 2: Welfare-loss minimization vs Robustness maximisation. For a given total defense
spending in the first column, columns 2-3 display the allocations that maximise expected utlity
(under best estimates of p˜ and P˜w), and the expected utility loss relative to the expected utility
maximizing allocation in the first row, (q˜(χ)). Columns 4-8 display for the same total defense
spending, the robustness maximising allocations for the minimally acceptable loss qc in the fifth
column. The expected utility loss is displayed in column 8, and the resulting robustness in
column 9.
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as consumption equivalent deviations from maximum expected utility, and this determines via
the envelope curve in Figure 4 the maximum degree of attainable robustness to model error. A
given combination of defense expenditure (χ1, χ2) delivers a monotonic relationship between the
value of qc and α̂ in Figure 4, which together generate an envelope that defines the relationship
between qc and α̂ (the additional blue curves correspond to the particular values of χ1 and χ2
that generate maximum robustness for the values qc = 0.05, 0.1, 0.15, 0.2). The more policy
makers are cognizant of the limitations of the information they possess, in terms of efficacy
of the measures they have at their disposal to both deter and repel aggression, the more we
should expect them to reach for solutions that achieve robustness through both greater military
expenditure and heavier reliance on the type of expenditure that is most effective at preventing
catastrophic losses.
4 Discussion
Often enough, the pursuit of policies designed to limit casualties without being robust to mis-
specification can prove, with hindsight, misguided. At other times, such policies can result in
complete catastrophe. Soon after the end of World War I the French government and military
immediately began a debate on the best way to prepare for renewed conflict with Germany. One
doctrine relied heavily on a smaller professional army well-trained in offense, and capable of mas-
tering the new techniques of maneuver. The alternative that was eventually adopted relied on a
larger force of conscripts backed by reservists to defend France’s borders along a static heavily
fortified front. On 30 September 1927, the Commission d’Organization des Re´gion Fortifie´es,
(CORF) was established to plan construction of a line of fortifications along France’s western
frontiers with Italy, Germany, portions of southern and central Belgium as well as Corsica, ulti-
mately came to bear the name of the Minister of War and decorated veteran of Verdun, Andre´
Maginot. The Maginot line was meant to protect France from a possible German invasion once
France had completed the planned evacuation of its forces from the Rhineland in 1935. The line
was based on a series of concrete multi-storied casements and ouvrages (fortresses). The smallest
housed a squad of thirty men manning twin 7.5mm machine guns and 37 or 47mm anti-tank
guns. The largest, the gros ouvrages, were large complex structures, built mostly underground,
housing garrisons of 500-1,000 men from where heavy artillery could be fired from turrets set in
the ground. Each was surrounded by their own series of machine gun turrets for protection.
The Maginot line’s appeal was its promise to both deter a German attack and, in the event
deterrence failed, to minimise French casualties by replacing ‘a wall of chests’ with ‘a wall of
concrete’. Between 1930 and 1935, by which time most of it had been completed, its construction
alone consumed between one-half and one percent of French output each year, at a time when
total French expenditure on defense averaged 4.7% of GDP (Thies, 1987). Two important gaps
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Figure 4: Each of the grey curves corresponds to a different combination of (χ1, χ2) and cap-
tures the tradeoff between q˜ and α̂. The envelope traced by the different grey curves represents
the maximum acceptable loss expressed as the consumption equivalent qc and the maximum
attainable robustness αˆ to model misspecification.
remained along the border with Belgium: near the sea, where the high water table precluded the
building of subterranean forts; and in the Ardennes, where Marshal Pe´tain, inspector general
of the army until 1931, had asserted the terrain was impassible to German armour (Kaufmann
and Kaufmann, 1997)
During the six-week German assault on France between 10 May 1940 and the signing of the
armistice on 22 June, nearly every fort along the Maginot line performed as it was designed—
they deterred direct attacks along the Franco-German border, and most successfully repulsed
those efforts made by the Germans to attack them from the east. Ultimately, however, Pe´tain’s
assurances notwithstanding, the Germans did move their armour through the Ardennes, out-
flanking the Maginot line and forcing French capitulation. French strategic doctrine, designed to
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operate under one set of conditions, was not robust to the unexpected, and ultimately failed in a
catastrophic manner. A doctrine that might have proven more robust to catastrophic failure—
that advocated by General Charles De Gaulle (but successfully implemented by Wehrmacht
General Heinz Guderian) of armoured forces able to move quickly to attack and fight indepen-
dently of the infantry—was rejected, in part because it implied the likelihood of higher casualties
(Kaufmann and Kaufmann, 2006)
In our interpretation, investment in the Maginot line was then akin to choosing high values
of χ1 (RMA in our more modern example). Had the Germans not found a way to circumvent
it, it might have repelled the invasion, and done so as designed—at the cost of relatively few
casualties. Instead it failed catastrophically—French planning was not sufficiently robust.
By contrast to the French experience during the second world war, America’s successful
invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Operation Iraqi Freedom) might seem in many regards vindication of
the US military’s embrace of the Revolution in Military Affairs doctrine. US forces toppled
Saddam Hussein’s regime in three weeks (between 20 March and 10 April 2003), at the cost of
139 American lives. Overall, less than one in every 2,300 coalition troops that participated in
the invasion were killed in action (Biddle, 2007). In the initial aftermath much of the success was
attributed to the adoption of high precision weaponry, and the Pentagon’s embrace of the RMA-
inspired “network-centric warfare” doctrine (i.e., “taking advantage of information technology to
radically enhance the effectiveness of “C4ISR”—command, control, communications, computers,
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance”), (Boot, 2003, p. 51).
The adoption of “network-centric warfare” was not merely a conventional upgrade of exist-
ing capabilities. The goal was to make the military, and in particular the US Army, quickly
deployable by shifting from a reliance on heavy tracked armour (64 metric ton M1 Abrams
tanks and 23 metric ton M3 Bradley armoured personel carriers) to forces mounted on wheeled
lightly-armoured vehicles (17 metric ton Stryker troop carriers) that could be easily deployed by
cargo planes (C-130 aircraft), but that lacked the armour necessary to protect soldiers against
munitions more powerful than .50 calibre rounds. Technology and intelligence, combined with
long-range, over-the-horizon, non-line-of-sight (NLOS) weapons designed to destroy the enemy
from a distance, would replace armour by obviating the need to withstand close combat with
the enemy (Kagan, 2007) while minimising civilian and military casualties (Futter, 2015). As
stated by Stuart Johnson, National Defense University: “...information technologies allow you
to substitute information for mass. If you buy into that, the whole force structure changes.”....
And he continued, “But the vision of all this is totally dependent on information technologies
and the network. If that part of the equation breaks down, what you have are small, less capable
battle platforms that are more vulnerable,”(Talbot, 2004, p. 40).
Indeed as with the Maginot line, the new army, transformed according to the specifications
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of the RMA doctrine, could prove vulnerable to catastrophic failure, as it relies on the many
elements of “network-centric warfare” to work perfectly. Kagan highlights the inherent non-
robustness of a force overreliant on RMA:
The Army’s transformation program, in fact, came to rely even more heavily than
the airpower visionaries on acquiring and disseminating perfect intelligence. The
airpower enthusiasts needed this intelligence to target the enemy systems effectively,
but Army units would require it merely to survive on the battlefield. (Kagan, 2007,
p. 251)
The year 2003 found the US military only part way through adoption of this new doctrine,
and the invasion of Iraq offered an opportunity to examine how those new systems, associated
with the “network-centric warfare” doctrine which had already been introduced performed (our
χ1), in conjunction with the yet to be transformed (and heavily armoured) divisions that the US
deployed (our χ2). How easily, and at what cost in casualties, might the latter have executed
the invasion had they undergone the full RMA transformation?12
New technologies did provide senior commanders unprecedented access to real-time intelli-
gence and this made the air war particularly effective. The Blue force tracking system, designed
to track friendly ‘blue forces’, radically reduced the number of casualties from ‘friendly fire’
incidents. Yet, in the years that followed, more nuanced interpretations of the events of 2003
emerged, suggesting that the success of the campaign at such a relatively low cost in lives of
US and coalition personel could be largely attributed to the poor state and leadership of the
Iraqi army rather than RMA. Beyond that, it became clear that particular systems at the very
heart of “network-centric warfare” doctrine, those designed to pass along to frontline units on
the ground the abundant real-time intelligence about the enemy ‘Red force’ that was streaming
into command headquarters in Kuwait and Qatar, nearly all failed.
The U.S. forces were all networked together, with a “blue force tracker” letting
them know the position of all the friendly units, just as the network theorists had
claimed would revolutionise war. The only problem is that they still didn’t know
who the enemy was (“the red force”) or when he was coming. As one report dryly
put it, “Situational awareness was proving to be more theoretical than actual.” Or,
as a marine joke, “When do we get red force trackers?”(Singer, 2009, pp. 189-190)
Mostly, this was an outcome of the Army’s Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE) failure to
support communications:
12The units that had already undergone the full transformation were either not deployed or had little influence
on any part of the campaign (Adams, 2006).
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In order to employ the system, the division’s signal battalion had to stop and
set up their equipment. As soon as they did, the rapidly advancing units promptly
ourtran the system’s 15-mile radius....
One brigade of the 3rd ID reported that whenever the unit moved, everything
would fail except for the Blue Force tracking system. Every few hours the unit would
stop, hoist up its antennas, log back into the network, and attempt to download
whatever it could. But software and bandwidth problems would lock up the computer
for 10 to 12 hours at a time, rendering it useless. Perversely, in three cases, U.S.
vehicles were attacked while they stopped to receive intelligence on enemy positions.
(Adams, 2006, p. 147)
Or stated more laconically in the Third Infantry Division’s After Action Report (2003, p.4):
“The communications available to all battlefield operating systems (BOS) other than maneuver
were insufficient to ensure timely, accurate, and relevant information dissemination across the
entire battlefield.”
The ‘digital divide’ between the flow of information available to senior commanders and
the dearth of information that flowed to frontline troops was exemplified by the experience of
Lt. Col. Ernest Marcone, a Battalion commander in the 69th Armoured Regiment, during
an operation code-named Objective Peach. Tasked with capturing the highly strategic al-Kaed
bridge spanning the River Euphrates thirty kilometers southwest of Baghdad on 2 April, 2003,
his unit was repeatedly ambushed on the way to its objective. The technology meant to provide
Marcone with real-time intelligence failed completely: “I would argue that I was the intelligence-
gathering device for my higher headquarters....Next to the fall of Baghdad that bridge was the
most important piece of terrain in the theater, and no one can tell me what’s defending it.
Not how many troops, what units, what tanks, anything. There is zero information getting
to me. Someone may have known above me, but the information didn’t get to me on the
ground.”(Talbot, 2004, p. 38)
For Marcone’s unit worse was to follow after the bridge was secured:
As night fell, the situation grew threatening....One communications intercept
did reach him: a single Iraqi brigade was moving south from the airport. But
Marcone says no sensors, no network, conveyed the far more dangerous reality, which
confronted him....He faced not one brigade but three: between 25 and 30 tanks, plus
70 to 80 armored personnel carriers, artillery, and between 5,000 and 10,000 Iraqi
soldiers coming from three directions. This mass of firepower and soldiers attacked
a U.S. force of 1,000 soldiers supported by just 30 tanks and 14 Bradley fighting
vehicles. The Iraqi deployment was just the kind of conventional, massed force that’s
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easiest to detect. Yet “We got nothing until they slammed into us“....Marcone only
learned what he was facing when the shooting began. (Talbot, 2004, pp. 38, 44)
What proved decisive was the yet-to-be phased-out heavy armour, which unlike a completely
transformed force, could operate effectively even when the larger systems of communications and
intelligence failed:
...it was old-fashioned training, better firepower, superior equipment, air support,
and enemy incompetence that led to a lopsided victory for the U.S. troops....Whereas
U.S. tanks could withstand a direct hit from Iraqi shells, Iraqi vehicles would “go
up like a Roman candle” when struck by U.S. shells....At Objective Peach, what
protected Marcone’s men wasn’t information armor, but armor itself. (Talbot, 2004,
p. 44)
Considering the likely outcome of Objective Peach had the tranformation of the army been com-
pleted and heavy armour not been available to Marcone, John Gordon of the Rand Corporation
conjectured, “If the army had had Strykers at the front of the column, lots of guys would have
been killed”, (Talbot, 2004, p. 44).
The original plan developed during the late 1990’s, to transform the US Army by 2025
and eventually replace entirely the Army’s heavy divisions, was indeed altered drastically as a
consequence of the Iraq war. Farrell et al. (2013, p. 231) cite “the physical frailty of the current
technology and the limits of what might be delivered in terms of enhanced battlefield knowledge,”
along with vulnerability of the Stryker vehicles deployed in the aftermath of the invasion to
improvised explosive devices and rocket-propelled grenades employed by the insurgents, for the
cancellation of the US Army’s more ambitious transformation programmes.13
Of course nothing in our analysis suggests that military planners should eschew new tech-
nologies, even those technologies that are by their very nature vulnerable to catastrophic failure.
What the info-gap approach does imply is that in an environment of non-probabilistic uncer-
tainty, military planners do need to take into account this type of vulnerability and its potentially
dire consequences when allocating limited defense resources. Kagan (2007, p. 352) cites “the
failures of the network” as a reason for not eliminating heavy armour from any future force. As
Biddle (2007, p.7) writes: “Instead, a balanced military in which the US can provide standoff
precision fires and conventional, close-combat ground maneuver, en masse if necessary, continues
to provide a valuable hedge against uncertainty.”
13As of 2018 the US Army had 58 Brigade Combat Teams, of which 16 were Armour against 9 Strykers (South,
2018)
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5 Conclusion
Our application of the information gap approach to the problem of allocating resources for
national security yields three broad conclusions, each of which is evaluated quantitatively. First,
the higher the robustness to model misspecification policy makers demand, the higher the overall
level of defense expenditures required. Second, the greater the demand for robustness, the
greater should be the reliance on those defense measures better suited to prevent extremely
high levels of damage. Similarly, the more robustness policy makers wish to achieve, the more
they should eschew investment in systems that promise the best expected outcomes on the
battlefield, but are also more vulnerable to catastrophical damage when they fail.
Beyond the normative recommendations for how policy makers can best allocate resources
to protect their countries from aggression, in a world in which much of the relevant information
is unreliable, the info-gap method also provides some positive insights into the reasons for the
policies policy makers choose today or have chosen in the past. In a world with unreliable prob-
abilistic information, we should not be surprised if policy makers lavish higher expenditure on
defense than would be appropriate if the only goal were expected utility maximisation. Further-
more, we would expect policy makers to favor expenditures on weapons systems, and associated
tactics and strategies, that are both most effective in preventing worst-case scenarios and are
also better understood. These would suggest one possible rationale for military planners’ repu-
tation for conservatism, and indeed inertia, when confronted with new and untried technologies
and doctrines.
A century before Frank Knight made the distinction between risk and uncertainty, Clausewitz
noted the problems associated with the unreliability of information in military settings.
Many intelligence reports in war are contradictory; even more are false, and most are
uncertain .... One report tallies with another, confirms it, magnifies it, lends it color,
till [the officer] has to make a quick decision which is soon recognized to be mistaken,
just as the reports turn out to be lies, exaggerations, errors, and so on. In short,
most intelligence is false, and the effect of fear is to multiply lies and inaccuracies
.... The general unreliability of all information presents a special problem in war:
all action takes place, so to speak, in a kind of twilight, which like fog or moonlight,
often tends to make things seem grotesque and larger than they really are. (von
Clausewitz, 1993, pp. 136, 161)
The information gap approach does nothing to ameliorate the unreliability of information, but
it does offer policy makers a methodology to make decisions better suited for such environments.
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Appendix A Derivation of the Robustness Function
We derive the robustness function for an horizon of uncertainty not exceeding unity, α ≤ 1.
We make no assumptions about the utility function u(c) other than that the marginal utility is
positive: u′(c) > 0.
The main task is to find the pdf of the damage, p(ψ|χ) which, at horizon of uncertainty α,
minimises the expected utility R(χ|p, Pw) defined in (1). Because the marginal utility is positive
it is evident that R(χ|p, Pw) is minimised by that pdf in F(α, p˜, P˜w) which assigns as much weight
as possible to large levels of damage and as little weight as possible to low levels of damage. For
the fractional-error info-gap model in (10), one readily shows that M(α, χ) = min R(χ|p, Pw)
in (7) occurs with the damage densities pˆ(ψ|χ) given in (14) and (15), for α ∈ (0, 1] and α > 1,
respectively.
Consider first the case α ≤ 1. The utility R(χ|p, Pw) in (1), evaluated with the pdf in (14),
is:
R(χ|p, Pw) = (r˜ − δrα− u(c))Pw + u(c) (24)
where r˜ and δr are defined in (11) and (20) and u(c) is the utility if an attack does not occur.
The term r˜ − δrα − u(c) is negative, since positive marginal utility implies that r˜1 > r˜2, and
therefore δr > 0, and r˜ < u(c). Consequently the value of Pw in F(α, p˜, P˜w) which reduces the
right-hand side of (24) to its minimum is (1 +α)P˜w. Thus the minimum expected utility, up to
horizon of uncertainty α < 1, is (see (7)):
M(α, χ) = (r˜ − δrα− u(c)) (1 + α)P˜w + u(c) (25)
Equating the right-hand side (25) to Rc yields a quadratic equation in α, the positive root of
which is given by:
α0(Rc, χ) =

(2r˜2−u(c))P˜w+
√
(2r˜2−u(c))2P˜ 2w+4δrP˜w
(
(r˜−u(c))P˜w+u(c)−Rc
)
2δrP˜w
if Rc ≤ R˜(χ)
0 otherwise
(26)
For instances where α ≥ 1:
M(α, χ) = ((1 + α)s˜2 − u(c)) (1 + α)P˜w + u(c) (27)
Following the same procedure yields an implicit relationship for the positive root:
α1(Rc, χ) =

(u(c)−2s˜2)P˜w+
√
[u(c)−2s˜2]2P˜ 2w−4s˜2P˜w
[
P˜ws˜2+(1−P˜w)u(c)−Rc
]
2s˜2P˜w
if Rc ≤ R˜(χ)
0 otherwise
, (28)
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where:
s˜2 =
∫ 1
ψα
u [(1− ψ)(1− χ1 − χ2)] p˜(ψ|χ) dψ. (29)
For each particular allocation χ there exists a value of Rc we denote as R
1
c such that
α0(R
1
c , χ) = α1(R
1
c , χ) = 1, where the values of ψm and ψα coincide and and hence so do the val-
ues of r˜2 and s˜2. For values of Rc ≤ R1c [Rc > R1c ], α0(Rc, χ) ≥ α1(Rc, χ) [α0(Rc, χ) < α1(Rc, χ)]
and hence α̂(Rc, χ) = α0(Rc, χ) [α̂(Rc, χ) = α1(Rc, χ)]. Together this implies that α̂(Rc, χ) =
max[α0(Rc, χ), α1(Rc, χ)]. We note that the values of both α0(Rc, χ) and α1(Rc, χ) are declining
in Rc. This can be directly seen in (26) for α0. it is important to emphasise that unlike (26),
(28) does not represent a closed-form solution for α1 because unlike ψm in (14), the value of the
quantile ψα, in (15) and (16) and hence s˜2 in (29) as well, are themselves non-linear functions
of α. Therefore for α̂ ≥ 1, the relationship between α̂(Rc, χ) and Rc can only be explored
numerically.
Appendix B Example Specifications of the Policymaker’s Best
Estimates of Model Components
This subsection presents the functional forms that we use in our subsequent illustration. These
specifications were chosen to reflect the historical magnitudes described above, and to capture the
intertwined channels through which defense allocations affect both the probability of suffering
an attack and the losses such an attack would impose. The best estimate of the pdf of damage,
conditional on being attacked, is assumed to be the Beta function:
p˜(ψ|χ) = ψ
a(χ)−1(1− ψ)b(χ)−1Γ(a(χ) + b(χ))
Γ(a(χ))Γ(b(χ))
, (30)
where the Gamma function is given by Γ(x) =
∫∞
0 t
(x−1)e−tdt and:
a(χ) = 1 +
χ1
χ2
+ θeθχ1 ln (χ1 + χ2)χ1, (31)
b(χ) = 2 +
χ1
χ2
+ eχ2 ln (χ1 + χ2)χ2. (32)
The mean of this pdf is:
E(ψ|χ) = Γ(1 + a(χ))Γ(a(χ) + b(χ))
Γ(a(χ))Γ(1 + a(χ) + b(χ))
(33)
We set the value of θ = 3 in our calculations.
The best estimate of the probability of suffering an attack is:
P˜w(χ) = 1−
(
β 1
2
(a(χ), b(χ))Γ(a(χ) + b(χ))(χ1 + χ2)
Γ(a(χ))Γ(b(χ))
) 1
5
(34)
where βx(a, b) ≡
∫ x
0 t
a−1(1 − t)b−1dt and a(χ) and b(χ) are defined in (31) and (32). The
term χ1 + χ2 represents the total military expenditure, and reflects its deterrent value. In
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our example there is an positive relationship between the expected damage (conditioned on
being attacked) that corresponds to a particular allocation of defense spending χ and the
probability of being attacked associated with that allocation. This can be seen in the term
β 1
2
(a(χ),b(χ))Γ(a(χ)+b(χ))(χ1+χ2)
Γ(a(χ))Γ(b(χ)) in (34) and represents the probability that damages will be small—
less than half the maximal possible damage—conditioned on attack taking place. Hence, the
higher this number is, the lower the likelihood that an adversary will be tempted to launch
an attack. Finally, we adopt the constant-risk-aversion specification for the utility function
u(c) = c1−γ/(1− γ), where γ > 0.14
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